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Summary
Current debate about land and agrarian reform in the post-Soviet Central Asian republics tends
to be couched in terms of stark choices between state, collective and private ownership,
whether of land, livestock, or operating capital. There is little discussion of the full range of
potential tenure arrangements in the 'middle ground' between private and state ownership,
including the possibility of common (endogenously evolved) as opposed to collective
(exogenously imposed) forms of property, yet recent research suggests these may become
increasingly important in the region in the near future. Part of the problem, this paper argues, is
semantic: the meaning of terms such as 'collective action' and 'common property' has been
tainted in the post-Soviet context by association with the failed experience of agricultural
collectivisation. But the problem is also substantive. Relations of trust and reciprocity, and
other features of what has come to be known as 'social capital', emerge as a essential
precondition for successful land and agrarian reform, yet in the aftermath of agricultural
collectivisation appear to be lacking precisely where it is most needed. This paper first
outlines an approach to distinguishing modes of operation of groups in society. Next, two
empirical case studies from Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan are offered in order to shed light on
some of the institutional challenges faced in the contemporary process of land and agrarian
reform. They illustrate how the lack of social capital currently presents a major obstacle to
successful economic transition. The paper concludes with some reflections on theory and
suggests questions for further research.
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1INTRODUCTION
The process of land and agrarian reform in post-Soviet Central Asia poses two curious
dilemmas. The first dilemma is about how we conceive of the difference between commons
and collectives. A great deal of experience has been gained internationally which suggests that
a pragmatic view should prevail of the range of land tenure options available in economic
development, and the many ways in which various forms of state, common, and private tenure
may be combined (Runge 1986; Bromley 1989; Behnke 1994). The debate about land reform
and farm restructuring in former Soviet republics, however, tends to be couched in terms of
stark choices between state, private and collective ownership, whether of land or of operating
capital (Brooks and Lerman 1994; Deiniger 1995), and rarely mentions 'true' commons. But it
will not surprise theorists of common property to learn that the future prosperity of the agrarian
sectors of former Soviet Central Asian republics is likely to require at least some forms of
'true' commons to persist.
The dilemma is that the prospects for initiating a debate on the issue of common property are
slim at present in Central Asia, because the meaning of the term 'collective' and, by
association, 'collective action' and 'common property', has been devalued. Discussion of the
underlying substantive issues is hampered by a widespread perception that these concepts are
necessarily associated with the failed Soviet experience of agricultural collectivisation (e.g.,
Deiniger 1995). There is a desperate need for new and innovative ideas in Central Asia's land
reform process, but language itself can be deceiving. While the now-extensive common
property resource management literature offers many useful insights in understanding the range
of land tenure options potentially available, they are likely to be misunderstood unless the
referents of 'collective' and 'common' property are specified very carefully. Collectivities that
are self-governing institutions for effective natural resource management in agriculture are
fundamentally different from the Soviet experience of hierarchically controlled agricultural
collectives.
The second dilemma is substantive rather than semantic, and concerns how we conceive of
collective action itself in transition economies. A growing literature points to the importance of
social capital in economic development, referring to 'the features of social organisation such as
trust, norms and networks that can facilitate the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions' (Putnam 1993: 167). It is argued in this paper that a fuller understanding of the way in
which economic institutions are socially embedded (Granovetter 1985) will greatly assist
those trying to bring about successful processes of economic transition in the former Soviet
Union (FSU) and elsewhere. Efficiency-enhancing forms of collective action appear to have
been undermined by the FSU's experience of agricultural collectivisation (cf, Mearns 1996).
The dilemma for Central Asia's land and agrarian reform process is that social capital appears
to be an essential ingredient of a successful economic transition, yet it may be lacking precisely
where it is most needed. Trust, in particular, emerges as a precondition for successful land and
agrarian reform, but how is it possible to build or generate trust through public policy? In order
to find possible ways out of this dilemma, efforts to understand the role of groups in society
need to be mounted on a broad front, going beyond the valuable yet ultimately limited insights
of the 'new institutional economics' (Stewart 1996; Roe 1993).
This paper is organised as follows. First we outline an approach to distinguishing modes of
operation of groups in society, offered here as a way to distinguish collectives and commons.
Next we consider two empirical cases from post-Soviet Central Asia in order to shed light on
some of the institutional challenges faced in the process of land and agrarian reform. The first
2describes the system of common pasture use in Kyrghyzstan, and explains why this does not at
present conform to 'good' group behaviour in the management of common property. The second
case describes the process of land reform and collective farm restructuring in one district of
Uzbekistan, and illustrates how the lack of social capital, or relations of trust/reciprocity,
presents a major obstacle to successful economic transition. The paper concludes with a brief
discussion of the underlying theoretical issues and suggests some questions for further
research.
I TOWARDS A THEORY OF GROUPS
From the broad and eclectic literature on institutions in society, two views of the functions of
institutions may be contrasted. The first is the efficiency argument: that institutions are a
response to market failure. This view derives from the very powerful insight of the 'new
institutional economics', that "institutions matter when transactions are costly" (North 1990).
While this has greatly contributed to our understanding of the role of institutions in economic
development, its weakness is its tendency towards functionalism (Harris et al. 1995). The
second view is that institutions are formed to advance the claims of their members to power
and resources, and play an active role in the building of civil society.
Frances Stewart (1996) offers a useful typology of the various modes of operation of groups in
society, which corresponds to the concept of 'institutional cultures' as used in the business
literature. The term 'group' is used here to include all possible types of formal and informal
institutions and organisations, following the distinctions made by Douglass North and others
(North 1990). This typology helps distinguish the type of institutions required for effective
common property resource management from those represented by Soviet-style agricultural
collectives. Stewart describes four modes of operation of groups, which are not mutually
exclusive. Many groups exhibit characteristics of more than one of these modes of operation:
Power/control (P/C) Such groups are characterised by hierarchical relations in which
orders are passed down from top to bottom, leaving those occupying lower levels of the
hierarchy little choice but to comply. The structure is often backed up by strong social or
ideological norms so that threats need rarely be used, but they also incur high monitoring and
supervision costs. The modern army is an example.
Market/ quasi-market (M) This refers to all groups involved in 'conventional' economic
transactions, including firms etc. Owing to information and transaction costs, however, many
operations remain outside of the market (cf. Williamson 1985). Power relations within groups
may mean poor terms may be forced on less powerful constituencies. In the field of rational
choice sociology, a wide range of social transactions, including social norms, may be
understood as quasi-market operations (Coleman 1988).
Trust/reciprocity (T/R) Such groups are characterised by a high degree of commitment
to the group, and a prevailing ethos of equality, trust and reciprocity among members. Such
commitments generally evolve as a result of repeated interactions of long duration. Shared
commitments need not imply equality among members, however. Group norms tend to be
influenced strongly by prevailing social norms (embeddedness). T/R-type groups may also be
efficiency enhancing, because T/R economises on government and monitoring, and makes the
most of local knowledge (Baland and Platteau 1996).
3Tradition/convention (T/C)  Such a mode of group operation is characterised by historically
evolved norms and values. This mode of operation is almost never exclusive, but can reinforce
other (T/R, M, P/C) modes of operation.
Agricultural collectives in the FSU strongly exhibit P/C characteristics in their mode of
operation. The standard model of agricultural organisation was imposed throughout the USSR
from the mid-1930s, codified in the 'kolkhoz [collective farm] model charter'. Peasant
households were replaced by large 'brigades' as the dominant production units. They were
given daily assignments by brigade leaders who in turn received their tasks from higher
authorities. The farms were strictly controlled by district and oblast (region) party and state
functionaries, who could bypass farm management when considered necessary. The dominance
of the Communist Party structure ensured compliance with the P/C mode of operation of
collectivised agriculture in at least three ways (Van Atta 1993): the power of party
nomenklatura over hiring and firing decisions; immunity of party members from state
prosecution; and the finely calibrated system of access to privileges and scarce goods. As Van
Atta has put it, the party 'governed who had what privileges, a powerful lever in a society
where all goods were in short supply and all paths of upward mobility were controlled by the
party apparatus' (Van Atta 1993: 11). The government structure itself militated against any
form of local self-sufficiency on the part of individual farms, and sought maximum control over
farms by manipulating their linkages with suppliers and markets. For example, machinery,
spare parts and fuel were provided through state supply organisations (Sel'khoztekhnika), for
which farms were required to pay in kind. This was one of the most important ways in which
surplus was extracted from rural areas and funnelled to the cities in the former Soviet Union,
and its legacy remains very powerful today.
Soviet agriculture was caught in a vicious circle, which progressively intensified the problem
of low incentives to labour productivity. Increasing capital investment led to higher-cost
production, with steadily decreasing returns in terms of gross output. Good farmers were
deported during collectivisation as 'class enemies', and the prevailing incentive structure drew
better motivated and higher skilled labour off the farms and into the cities. The remaining
peasants earned piece rates and performed the bare minimum of work on the collective or state
farms. Since good farms were held liable for the failures of less successful neighbouring farms,
wise farm managers might deliberately ruin their farms in order to get lower plan production
targets and higher state subsidies (Van Atta 1993; Khan 1996).
By contrast, it has become almost axiomatic that true 'commons' are underpinned by institutions
that exhibit T/R characteristics. Some of the well-documented conditions for successful
collective action in natural resource management include: smallish, stable group and resource
boundaries; enforceable sanctions, and strong reinforcement of 'good' group behaviour by
means of social norms including the high social cost of loss of reputation; a degree of
interdependence among resource users; the passive support of or at least benign neglect from
government agencies; and the possibility of drawing on local knowledge to enhance efficiency
(Runge 1986; Wade 1987; Ostrom 1990; Mearns 1996; Baland and Platteau 1996).
These conditions tend to be absent under collectivised agriculture. Moreover, the prevailing
norms of dysfunctional group behaviour under Soviet-style agricultural collectives became
progressively more entrenched by the perverse incentive structure, so that tradition and
convention (T/C) tended over time to reinforce P/C modes of group operation. The functions of
Soviet-style agricultural collectives cannot be explained using the efficiency argument of new
institutional economics. Nor could collectives be said to advance the claims of their members,
4although over time they evolved into an apparatus that does appear to have served rather well
the interests of the controlling party bureaucracy. It is suggested here that the likelihood of
successful land and agrarian reform in post-Soviet Central Asia depends on the extent to which
institutions of civil society are allowed to emerge to strengthen T/R modes of group operation.
II CASE 1: COMMON GRAZING IN KYRGHYZSTAN
Significance of livestock production and common grazing in the Kyrghyz economy
The share of agriculture in the Kyrghyz economy is estimated to be between 30 and 40 per cent
(World Bank 1993; World Bank 1994), and is currently increasing owing to the severe
contraction of industry since the collapse of the USSR. In 1992, livestock contributed around
43 per cent of gross output in agriculture, if physical quantities are valued at current prices
(World Bank 1994). Crops make up the remainder of agricultural output. However, some 70
per cent of the Republic's arable land area was formerly devoted to producing livestock feed,
including barley and other grains, legumes such as lucerne, hay and straw. Kyrghyzstan was the
third most important meat and wool producing republic in the former Soviet Union after the
much larger republics of Russia and Kazakhstan. Total recorded livestock numbers have been
falling since 1989, suggesting that the brunt of the decline in agricultural production has been
borne by the livestock sector. Total animal numbers fell from their peak of 18 million sheep
equivalents3 in 1989, to around 14 million sheep equivalents at the start of 1994.
However, it is likely that these data significantly underestimate the actual contribution of
livestock to the agricultural sector, in spite of falling total livestock numbers. The role of
livestock production is becoming relatively even more important, as there are few other
economic opportunities, at least in the short term. A significant and rising proportion of
livestock production derives from the household sector. In 1991, less than a third of grazing
animals were in private hands. By the start of 1994, over half of all grazing animals were
privately owned. Much of the livestock and livestock product output from the household sector
is untraded or exchanged in barter transactions, and is largely unmeasured by official statistics
based on traded output from state and collective farms, and the newer forms of agricultural
enterprise resulting from agrarian reforms implemented since 1991. Table 1 summarises the
rising share of livestock transferred to private hands between 1991 and 1994.
                                                            
3 1 cow/horse = 5 sheep/goats.
5Table 1 Changing relative shares of state/ collective and privately owned livestock,
Kyrghyzstan, 1991-94
(1 January figures, expressed in sheep equivalents)
Type of
ownership
1991
(%)
1992
(%)
1993
(%)
1994
(%)
State/
collective 70 61 51 43
Private 30 39 49 57
(of which:
peasant
enterprises)
(0) (5) (11) (8)
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (Livestock Division), Republic of Kyrghyzstan
Note: 'Private' includes both animals owned by individual households and those owned by
peasant enterprises.
At Independence in 1991, Kyrghyzstan inherited a structurally distorted agricultural sector that
failed to reflect its true resource endowments. Over 90 per cent of the territory of Kyrghyzstan
is mountainous, lying at altitudes above 1500 metres. Some 44 per cent of this total area, or 82
per cent of the agricultural land area of almost 11 million hectares, is natural pasture land held
almost entirely as common grazing4. Yet, as a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of the USSR,
the Kyrghyz Republic developed an export livestock industry dependent on imported and
underpriced feed. Agricultural policy focused overwhelmingly on increasing the size of the
national herd. Table 2 shows the increase in total grazing livestock between 1916 and 1991. It
is likely that the 1941 livestock population of a little over 7 million equivalents reflects the
consequences of forced collectivisation during the 1920s and early 1930s, which is reported to
have decimated the livestock population at the time. Livestock numbers increased considerably
through the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1960 and 1987, the number of sheep and goats
increased by 66 per cent, cattle by over 50 per cent, and horses by 25 per cent (World Bank
1994), reaching a historical peak herd size of 18 million sheep equivalents in 1989, of which
10.5 million were sheep and goats.
                                                            
4 'Common grazing' refers to land that is used for grazing livestock by a defined group of land users. Since the
pasture land allotted to any given state or collective farm, for example, is also used by its individual member
households for grazing their private animals, the territory used by such enterprises is regarded as common
grazing. It does not matter whether or not pasture land is fenced for it to be defined as being held or used in
common. Fenced pasture land (or, for example, fenced arable land that is grazed following harvest) is
understood to be common grazing if it is used by a defined group of land users during any specified period of
time. Spring/ autumn grazing in particular includes significant areas of arable land that are grazed before spring
planting and after the harvest, as well as hay meadows that are grazed in spring and after cutting in the late
summer.
6Table 2 Livestock population totals, Kyrghyz Republic, 1916-91
('000 head)
1916 1941 1968 1991
Sheep & goats 2544.0 2529.1 9467.0 9968.1
Cattle 519.0 554.9 912.0 1205.5
of which: cows  (%) 36 40 42 32
Horses 708.0 407.7 259.7 312.7
Total sheep
equivalents
8679.0 7342.1 15325.5 17559.1
Source: Tynaliev (1994)
This increase in the number of grazing livestock was made possible only by an increased
reliance on imported grain. By 1987 the amount of grain used for animal feed was twice that
for human consumption. Total animal feed requirements quadrupled between 1960 and 1987,
while the consumption of feed concentrates (largely grain) increased by six times (World Bank
1994). Along with the increased dependence on imported feedgrain came a decline in the share
of animal nutritional requirements met from open pasture. Feed from open pasture declined in
absolute as well as relative terms, owing to a reported secular decline in pasture yield under
heavy grazing pressure, and the conversion of some pasture land to arable cropland. Efforts
were made to improve pastures so as to increase physical yields, based on technical solutions
such as the application of herbicides and fertilisers, and re-seeding with higher-yielding forage
species, but these efforts affected no more than 3 per cent of the total pasture area.
Since 1991, many of these trends have been reversed. The proportion of animal feed
requirements met from open pasture has been increasing, as the cost of imported grain has risen
sharply, domestic grain production has fallen owing to input supply constraints, and the
availability of higher quality feeds such as concentrates at affordable prices has declined
accordingly. Owing to a sharp decline in cereal imports, and a decline in imported seed (e.g.,
barley from the Ukraine and Kazakhstan), a significant share of arable land has been converted
to wheat production. Sugar beet production has also increased to replace lost imports for
domestic processing from Cuba. By the late 1980s, the effective level of subsidy to the
agricultural sector had risen to levels that could no longer be sustained. Capital-intensive,
technical approaches to pasture improvement have also proved too costly with rising input
prices, but it is perceived by Kyrghyz specialists and herders alike that at least some formerly
'degraded' pastures are now recovering following the decline in grazing pressure.
With regard to the future of Kyrghyzstan's common grazing lands, on which the livestock sector
depends, these apparently positive trends should not be taken as grounds for complacency.
They make Kyrghyzstan's common pastures and the evolved system of seasonal transhumance
more, not less, important in the transition towards a market economy, in spite of the reduction
in the total number of grazing livestock. It is a matter of central importance to the national
economy that these pastures are managed in a productive and sustainable manner.
Grazing systems in Kyrghyzstan
The Kyrghyz were a mainly horse-breeding people prior to the incursion of Russians and
Ukrainians into Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. Sheep and cattle were
7less important overall, since they are less mobile than horses over long-distance transhumance
routes, and are less able to get at forage grasses under deep snow. By the late nineteenth
century, permanent dwellings became the norm at herders' winter camps, and simple stock
shelters were constructed. With an expansion of the irrigated cropland area, especially after
collectivisation in the 1920s and 1930s, the transition to a more settled form of agriculture
became more marked. Sheep-breeding became progressively more important, and more
productive, albeit less hardy, fine wool and semi-fine wool breeds of sheep were developed.
Grazing land tenure in Kyrghyzstan is characterised by seasonal transhumance. Prior to
collectivisation, identifiable areas of pasture were customarily owned by kin-based groups,
requiring vertical movement between low-lying mountain valleys in the winter to high alpine
meadows in summer. Sheep and horses would be pastured together, normally herded by
relatives of their owners. With very little fodder crop production, the limiting factor on animal
numbers was the availability of forage from winter pastures.
Following collectivisation, this pattern of transhumance continued to prevail. However, a
significant proportion of the rural population now remained in villages all year round, leaving
the task of distant summer pasturing to relatively fewer specialised shepherds and herders as
paid employees of state farms, or members of collectives. One herding family would typically
be responsible for 500 sheep or 50-70 cattle. The distance of annual transhumant movement
ranges from around 30-40 to 200-300 km from rural settlements. Table 3 shows the fall in the
share of the total livestock herding population that remained transhumant following
collectivisation. At around 70 per cent, this share has remained remarkably constant throughout
the collective period.
Table 3 Total herding population and share of transhumant herders, Kyrghyz
Republic, 1916-91
1916 1941 1968 1991
Total number
of herders
90,598 72,996 108,284 125,531
Number of
transhumant
herders
90,598 52,824 78,284 87,362
Transhumant
herders (% of
total)
100 72 72 70
Note: 'Herders' here include all state farm employees or collective members who look after
livestock, and their families and dependants.
Source: Tynaliev (1994)
During the period of collectivised production, the grazing land of each state farm or collective
was allocated by the local Soviet (rural council) for its perpetual use, although all land was
state owned.
Under collectivisation, considerable investments were made in sheepfolds and other sheds and
stockyards for use during the winter, as well as in feed supplementation. Only yaks and rams
remain all year round on open pasture. If there is little or no snow, fine wool and semi-fine
8wool sheep graze on pastures close to villages and sheepfolds during the day in winter; they
are kept in sheds protected from wind during heavy snowfall, and are fed on hay. Shearing of
sheep generally takes place around May before sheep are driven to the summer pastures;
however, it has not been uncommon for sheep to be sheared at the high summer pastures, where
spring arrives considerably later than in the low-lying valleys.
Kyrghyz grazing systems are multi-species systems in that each agricultural enterprise tends to
maintain a diverse herd of grazing animals, including sheep and goats, horses, and cattle (and
sometimes yaks), even if it does have some relative specialisation in one species. The most
specialised livestock-rearing enterprises are the horse studs and other breeding farms; even
these also keep livestock of other types.
There three types of pasture are defined by seasonal use: spring/ autumn; summer and winter.
Of the total pasture area, 3 million ha (33%) are spring/ autumn pastures at altitudes of 1500-
2500 metres, with a 6 month grazing season; 3.7 million ha (42%) are high-altitude summer
pastures at 2500-3500 metres, with a 3-4 month grazing season; and 2.3 million ha (25%) are
winter pastures at a range of altitudes, with a grazing season of 4-5 months.
In winter, most animals, except rams and yaks, are housed in sheepfolds and other buildings
close to permanent settlements, for approximately the period November- March. In good
weather they may graze pastures close to these buildings in narrow, sheltered valleys, and
otherwise on south-facing slopes with higher insolation and lower snow-cover. In the case of
animals owned by land users in the Chu valley that over-winter in Kazakhstan, up to 300 km
distant, they remain longer on the winter pastures in Kazakhstan and from there move straight to
summer pastures in Kyrghyzstan.
During autumn and spring, many animals are kept at night in the same pens and folds as during
winter, but are grazed during the day, frequently on arable and hay land either before spring
sowing or after autumn harvest. Autumn and spring pastures usually lie relatively close to
permanent settlements (e.g. 3-4 km away).
In the summer, herds and flocks are, in principle, grazed on distant, high-altitude pastures
known as jailoo. It is only at this time of year that herders leave their permanent village houses
and live in yurts or bozui. Throughout the summer season, herders tend to move their herds and
flocks further and further upslope as new forage growth becomes available, and as lower
pastures are grazed out. They return to the autumn pastures when the weather turns, and/or
following hay-cutting (usually in late-July - August) or cereal harvest (usually in September).
Although experienced herders tend to be familiar with particular valleys or pastures, there is
considerable variation on a local scale in the actual areas of pasture grazed at a given time
each summer, depending on weather conditions and forage availability.
9Pasture forage availability in relation to grazing livestock
Total numbers of grazing livestock in Kyrghyzstan fell from their 1989 peak of 18.1 million
sheep equivalents to a January, 1994 level of 14.2 mn. Much of this decline is accounted for by
sheep and goats, which have fallen from 10.5 mn heads in 1989 to 7.3 mn by January 1994.
Cattle numbers declined less sharply from 12.1 mn heads (1989) to 10.6 mn (1994); while the
total number of horses continued to increase steadily from its 1980 level of 2.6 mn heads to 3.2
mn by 1994. The declining horse population throughout the period of collectivised production,
owing to the mechanisation of agriculture, has been reversed in recent years as horses are once
again becoming valued for their draught power and as a means of transport.
The major reasons for the decline in total livestock, and especially sheep and goat numbers,
are associated with the transfer of animals from the state and collective farm sector into private
ownership (see table 1). Privately owned animals are defined here as including both animals
owned by individual households, whether those households are members of state or collective
farms or any other type of agricultural enterprise; and animals owned by peasant enterprises. In
1991 there were no peasant enterprises, until after the Law on Peasant Economy was approved
later that year. By the start of 1994, still only 8 per cent of total sheep equivalents were owned
by peasant enterprises, while 49 per cent were owned by individual households.
There are several reported reasons for a decline in total grazing livestock numbers following
the privatisation or re-organisation of agricultural enterprises. First, following the
redistribution of livestock, many individual households were left with too few animals to form
viable herds and flocks, which were consequently treated as disposable income and a ready
source of household food rather than as capital. Second, in an economy that is chronically short
of cash and in which barter exchange has become a norm, sheep and sheep products are
commodities that can be bartered relatively easily for essential items such as fuel, cereals, and
agricultural inputs such as livestock feed, seed and fertiliser. Third, serious capital constraints
have reduced the production and purchasing of winter feed, which is reported to have led to a
significant degree of 'distress' slaughtering of livestock that cannot be carried through the
winter.
The transfer of animals into private hands has been accompanied by the privatisation of a
significant proportion of arable land formerly sown to fodder crops under state and collective
farms. Production of feed concentrates, and other higher quality feeds such as silage, has
declined to significantly below requirements owing to a general shortage of working capital.
These factors have exacerbated the already acute winter feed shortage, and have increased
relative dependence on open pastures to meet animal nutritional requirements.
In spite of the overall decline in livestock numbers, standing forage from open pasture cannot
meet total animal nutritional requirements, and supplementary feeds will remain essential. At
the 1994 mean stocking density across the Republic, the availability of forage from open
pasture expressed as a proportion of total forage demand was 82 per cent for summer pastures,
47 per cent for spring/autumn pastures, and 11 per cent for winter pastures (based on data
provided by the Institute of Pastures and Forage). The respective proportions by oblast are
shown in table 4. It should be noted that these estimates are based on a crude comparison of
aggregate stocking densities with estimated forage availability. They do not take into account
other factors such as the feeding preferences of different grazing animals.
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Table 4 Crude feed balance from open pasture by oblast at actual stocking
densities, Kyrghyzstan, 1994
Oblast Stocking
density
('000 sheep
equivalents)
FA/FD
summer
(%)
FA/FD
spring/
autumn
(%)
FA/FD
winter (%)
Mean
stocking
rate, 1994
(sheep
equivalents
/ha)
Djalal-
Abad
  2355 105   51     7 1.88
Issyk-Kul   2422   72   33   10 1.77
Naryn   2446   75   51   15 0.98
Osh   3456   57   59     6 2.40
Talas   1017 217   50   22 0.88
Chu   2513   57   37   12 2.02
Republic 14209   82   47   11 1.58
Source: Institute of Pastures and Forage
Note: FA = forage availability from open pasture; FD = forage demand at given stocking
densities.
Geographical distribution of pastures
The principal determinant of the geographical distribution of various types of seasonal pasture
used as common grazing in Kyrghyzstan is altitude, as described above. There is some degree
of regional variation between oblasts in this respect, which can be deduced from table 4.
Osh and Djalal-Abad oblasts, in the South of the Republic, and Chu oblast in the North, have a
relatively higher proportion of irrigated lowland cropping than other oblasts. Livestock
production systems in these oblasts is relatively more integrated with crop production, and
reliance on feed from open pasture is lower. This partly explains the higher mean stocking
rates in these oblasts, compared with the Republic average of 1.58 sheep equivalents
(se)/ha/yr. In Osh the mean stocking rate is 2.40 se/ha/yr; in Chu, 2.02 se/ha/yr; and in Djalal-
Abad, 1.88 se/ha/yr. In particular, these oblasts are short of winter pasture, since much of the
land that would once have provided winter pasture has been given over to arable cropping.
The oblasts with the highest dependence on open pasture for meeting animal nutrition needs are
Naryn and Talas, with mean stocking rates of 0.98 and 0.88 se/ha/yr respectively. Issyk-Kul
falls somewhere in between, with mean stocking rates close to the Republic average.
High-altitude summer pastures are distributed relatively evenly throughout the Republic, but
the most important areas of summer pasture are relatively few in number. They include Sary
Djaz and Archialy in Issyk-Kul oblast; Ak-Sai and Song-Köl in Naryn oblast; Suusamir in Chu
oblast; Chatkal in Djalal-Abad oblast; and Alai in Osh oblast. To give an indication of the
order of magnitude of these pastures: the total area of Ak-Sai (Naryn) is 520,800 ha; Song-Köl
(Naryn) is 93,100 ha; and Suusamir (Chu, formerly Naryn) is 257,200 ha.
Even given the increasing relative importance of pastures in meeting animal nutritional
requirements, a large proportion of distant summer pastures remain significantly underused.
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Indicative figures obtained from the Institute of Forage and Pastures suggest that an average of
43 per cent of total summer pastures across the Republic by area remain unused in 1994. The
underuse of summer pastures varies between oblasts, ranging from 25 per cent in Naryn and
Talas oblasts, to more than 50 per cent in Osh and Issyk-Kul. The main reason for this underuse
of available high quality, high altitude summer pasture land is the shortage of working capital
for the purchase of fuel with which to move herding families to the summer pastures, and to
provide them with a limited range of support services while they are there. This constraint
affects all forms of agricultural enterprise.
Owing to the underuse of distant summer pastures and the decline in availability of higher
quality supplementary feed, considerable additional grazing pressure is currently being placed
on pastures close to settlements, and especially on spring/autumn pastures. This is regarded as
perhaps the most serious issue facing Kyrghyzstan's common pastures at present.
Legislative and policy framework
The legal framework for land tenure in general comprises the Land Code, the Law on Land
Reform, and the Law on Peasant Economy (all enacted in 1991), all of which represent a move
towards private property yet without establishing a land market. The Land Code of the Kyrghyz
Republic is currently under revision (see Bloch et al. 1995) for a comprehensive discussion of
the legislative and policy framework for land and agrarian reform in Kyrghyzstan).
The Constitution (5 May 1993) states clearly the principle that land shall the property of the
state, i.e., that the state reserves the right of eminent domain. Although it made possible the
granting of 'rights of private possession' to 'citizens and their associations', the Constitution
specifically prohibited market transactions in land rights. The Presidential Decree of 22
February 1994, 'On measures to intensify the land and agrarian reform in the Kyrghyz Republic'
further specified that use rights may be held by citizens and juridical persons over plots of
arable and hay land for up to 49 years, and for the first time provided for a market in such land
rights to develop.
The legal framework specific to pasture land tenure and management also begins with the
above framework. Under the Decree, 'On measures to intensify the land and agrarian reform in
the Kyrghyz Republic', pasture land may be leased on a short-term or long-term basis, on terms
to be laid down by the Ministry of Agriculture, with priority given to existing shepherds and
herders. The 12 September, 1991, Decree 'On regulations governing the provision and use of
close and distant pastures in the Kyrghyz Republic' defines 'short-term' as a period of up to 5
years, while 'long-term' refers to a period of up to 10 years. Under this decree, pasture land is
allocated to agricultural enterprises for long-term use for up to 25 years.
The 1991 Decree, 'On regulations governing the provision and use of close and distant
pastures..', also established for the first time the principle that pasture land use requires
payment to be made. The 22 February, 1994, decree 'On measures to intensify land and
agrarian reform..' requires that existing levels of pasture land taxes be increased twenty-fold.
Other provisions under the 1991 decree on pasture land allocation and use specify the
responsibilities of land users and the relevant authorities; and specifically prohibit the sale,
mortgage or other transactions in pasture land. Another decree approved in 1991 concerned the
regulations for droving livestock through the territory of the Kyrghyz Republic.
Current arrangements for grazing land allocation and management
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During the period of collectivised agriculture, grazing land was allocated to state farms and
collectives according to 'demand', i.e. the existing and future planned number of grazing
animals. Land allocation was carried out on the authority of the local Soviet (rural council) for
enterprises within its jurisdiction. As of mid-1994, this was still, in principle, the system that
operated, although there was a wider range of types of agricultural enterprise, including
cooperatives, joint-stock companies, individual peasant enterprises and associations, as well
as the remaining state farms and collectives.
Individual peasant enterprises comprise either single families, or a small group of families
who are likely to be related. For example, the herders of one peasant enterprise interviewed in
their summer pastures in Ak-Suu raion, Naryn oblast, were the sons of three brothers who, with
their families, made up the overall peasant enterprise. Peasant enterprises who keep animals
normally do so as a small part of their overall operation. As they are at best 'part-time' herders,
they tend not to take their own animals to pasture. Instead, a group of peasant enterprises, like
individual households, will club together to pay a herder or shepherd to take their livestock to
pasture. One shepherd interviewed in Djeti-Oguz raion, Issyk-Kul oblast, for example, was
responsible for the summer grazing of a total flock of 600 sheep, owned by 36 separate
households; and 110 cattle, owned by 60 different households. The fee paid to the shepherd by
each household was 6 som/sheep. The shepherd assumes responsibility for paying the pasture
land tax element out of this gross income.
The leader of the relevant local agricultural enterprise has the final say as to which pasture
areas should be used, but each shepherd will normally use the pastures he/she knows best, and
there is considerable flexibility in practice over the choice of pasture sites. If two shepherds
wish to use the same pasture site, and it is felt there is not sufficient grass for both to use,
priority would go to the more experienced herder, or the one who has used it for the longest
period. In the case of any dispute, the leader of the enterprise (or, under proposed reforms, of
the rural committee) would decide.
From interviews with many herders, it appears almost inconceivable that there would be overt
disputes over grazing between herders within the same enterprise, but it is possible to imagine
disputes between neighbouring enterprises or (more likely) raions. For example, Naryn raion
(then called Tien-Shan) leased pasture land to Kochgor raion around 15 years ago. The
Kochgor herders are now used to these pastures, and are very unwilling to see them revert to
Naryn raion. Individual herders know nothing of the paperwork, and understand only historical
precedent; the basis of the original agreement is often all but forgotten, whether short-term,
long-term, or permanent. In general, if there are disputes between enterprises within a single
raion, they are resolved at raion level; in the case of disputes between raions, at oblast level.
In both cases, the administration akim makes the final decision, based on submission of
evidence prepared by the local land inspection service.
Shepherds and herders are allocated pastures by the relevant agricultural enterprise (state or
collective farm, cooperative, association of peasant enterprises) according to the number of
animals in their care, and rely on the enterprise for transport to summer pastures, which they
pay for out of the gross income received from the livestock owners. There is little possibility
or incentive for individual herders to insist on using distant summer pastures, and considerable
incentive for them to save on the cost of transport and seek to use pastures closer to
settlements, including spring/autumn pastures.
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These arrangements for the use of common pastures in contemporary Kyrghzystan exhibit
characteristics of both P/C and T/R modes of group operation, although P/C type relations
remain dominant. As might be expected of family-based farms, trust and reciprocity play a
significant role in the operation of peasant farm enterprises. There is some collective action
among peasant farm enterprises in arranging for the joint summer pasturing of their livestock.
Shepherds at the jailoo (high-altitude summer pastures) are allowed to use considerable
discretion and skill in their choice of pastures, drawing on their knowledge and experience.
Yet the power and control of the large farm enterprises that have superseded the collectives
remains powerful, and by continuing to insist on allocative decision making they tend to quash
local initiative. The system of common pasture management is likely to become increasingly
important for livestock production in Kyrghyzstan, but does not yet meet the conditions
required for success.
III CASE 2: LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM AT DISTRICT LEVEL, 
UZBEKISTAN
The actual implementation of land and agrarian reforms in Central Asia differs widely between
regions (oblasts), between districts (raions), and between former state or collective farm
enterprises within individual districts. In a hierarchically controlled system in which
legislation and policy is handed down from above in the form of government and Presidential
decrees, as in Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan, the way the reform process is played out in practice
depends on the relative power and influence of various local constituencies over the
administrative officials responsible for implementing the reforms. The nature of these
constituencies varies considerably from one locality to another, as do the personalities and
competencies of the officials in question. The district is a useful unit of analysis for
understanding such processes in Uzbekistan, since the power and personal disposition of the
district khokim (governor) is an important determinant of the pace and character of practical
reforms.
Here we describe the practical progress made with land reform and farm restructuring for
Bulungur district, Samarkand oblast, Uzbekistan, over the period 1990-96. We focus
particularly on the new peasant farms, and the severe structural constraints to production they
currently face. For purposes of comparison, data are also presented for the oblast as a whole.
In terms of both land use and 'pre-reform' farm enterprise structure, Bulungur is somewhat
atypical. Most significantly, virtually no cotton is grown in Bulungur District.
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Approximately half of the district's total agricultural land area of 56,562 ha is irrigated. The
principal uses of agricultural land are arable crops and vegetables, including wheat, maize for
silage, potatoes and onions (51% of agricultural area); perennial tree crops including
vineyards and fruit orchards (17% of agricultural area); and pasture land (32% of agricultural
area). The information presented here is based on semi-structured interviews with farm
managers, specialists, and farm workers/members on visits to a range of farm enterprises in
Bulungur District during September 1995 and March-April 1996.
Progress of land reform in practice
A useful indicator of achievements in land reform to date is the proportion of total farm land
that has been transferred to cultivators. The relevant indicators are the proportions of farm land
transferred to 'subsidiary' or household farm plots and to peasant farms (differences between
the various types of farm enterprise are described below). Care is required with interpreting
these data, since in available statistical records, landholdings of leasehold peasant farms and
private subsidiary plots are included in the totals for other (state, collective and cooperative)
farm enterprises. Tables 5 and 6 compare the changes in agricultural landholdings for
Samarkand oblast and Bulungur District over the period 1990-96. The share of farm land held
by agricultural enterprises of different types over the same period is shown in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7 Share of farm land by type of enterprise, Samarkand oblast, 1990-96 (%)
Type of farm
enterprise
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
State 78 78 68 70 67 3 3
Collective 21 21 31 29 31 25 20
Cooperatives, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 71 76
Subsidiary 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Other 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Independent
peasant
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Leasehold peasant 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
Private plots 4 4 7 5 5 5 6
Source: Department of Land Affairs, Samarkand oblast
Note: Totals add to more than 100% because private plots and leasehold peasant farms are
included in totals for other farm enterprises.
For Samarkand oblast as a whole, 78% of farm land was held by state farms in 1990, and 21%
by collective farms. Private farm plots, included in these totals, made up 4% of total
agricultural land. By 1996, the share of farm land held by state farms had declined to just 3%,
with 20% held by collectives and 76% by new cooperative-type farm enterprises. Peasant
farms established between 1993 and 1996 made up a total of 4% of farm land, and private
subsidiary plots had risen to 6% of total farm land.
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Table 8 Share of farm land by type of enterprise, Bulungur District, 1990-96 (%)
Type of farm
enterprise
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
State 99 99 99 96 66 0 0
Collective 0 0 0 2 31 30 32
Cooperatives, etc. 0 0 0 0 0 66 64
Subsidiary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Independent
peasant
0 0 0 1 1 2 2
Leasehold peasant 0 0 0 2 4 6 10
Private plots 5 6 6 7 7 7 7
Source: Department of Land Affairs, Samarkand oblast
Note: Totals add to more than 100% because private plots and leasehold peasant farms are
included in totals for other farm enterprises.
There are some significant differences in the situation in Bulungur District. In 1990, 99% of
farm land was held by state farms, including private household plots amounting to 5% of the
total area. By the beginning of 1996, the former state farms, by now re-organised as
collectives, cooperatives and 'leased' collectives, still retained 96% of total farm land. Within
this total however, leasehold peasant farms held 10% of total farm land, and private plots
accounted for an additional 7% of farm land. In January, independent peasant farms made up
2% of total farm land, lying outside the territory of the collective farms, but this proportion has
since been re-integrated with collective farm land. In sum, around 17% of total farm land has
been transferred to cultivators themselves, although severe structural constraints mean that
peasant farmers are strongly limited in the degree of freedom they can exercise in the use of
their land.
Farm size distribution
Table 9 shows the change in mean size of farms in Bulungur district by type of farm enterprise,
over the period 1990-96. The major type of farm enterprise existing in 1990 were state farms,
with average landholdings of 5,079 ha. State farms did not change very much in size until they
were all re-organised around 1994-95. Collective farms established from 1993 onwards were
on average around half the size of the state farms. This figure is somewhat inflated by the
inclusion of three farms with significant unirrigated and pasture areas. These three farms have
per capita landholdings of 36 ha, 19 ha and 27 ha respectively, as compared with the average
per capita landholding of 2.4 ha for the remaining 14 collective farms in the district which
specialise in irrigated horticultural crops (vineyards, fruit orchards and other vegetables). The
'leased' collectives, essentially state farms renamed during 1995, are slightly larger than the
average collective farm, with mean landholdings of 3,730 ha. The independent peasant farms
established in Bulungur were anomalously large (around 300 ha on average), and have since
been abolished or 'reorganised'. Leasehold peasant farms, the only true family-based farms in
Bulungur, grew in mean size from an initial 3 ha in 1993 to around 14 ha in 1994, and have
remained consistently of this size since then. Private subsidiary plots, as laid down in the Law
on Land, are on average 0.2 ha each.
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Table 9 Mean farm size by type of farm enterprise, Bulungur District, 1990-96 (ha)
Type of farm
enterprise
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
State 5079 4436 4435 4271 4657 4650 n.a.
'Leased' n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3730
Collective n.a. n.a. n.a. 1947 2817 2817 2213
Subsidiary 19 29 20 20 27 27 18
Other 75 150 80 80 58 58 50
Independent
peasant
65 67 76 212 445 445 328
Leasehold peasant n.a. n.a. 3 10 14 14 12
Private subsidiary 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Source: Land Use Planning Officer, Bulungur district
At a more detailed level, Table 10 shows total leasehold peasant farm holdings within the
territory of collective farms in Bulungur district for the beginning of 1996, and leasehold
landholdings per capita. There is considerable variation at local level (i.e., between collective
farms) in the share of total farm land allocated to leasehold peasant farms. At one extreme lies
Gubdin, with only 2% of total land allocated to peasant farms, while some farms (e.g., Dustlik,
Forty Years of Victory) have allocated around 30% of their total area to peasant farmers. Per
capita landholdings on peasant farms also very widely, according to the availability of land in
the relevant kishlak (settlements). The range of variation for irrigated land is generally
between 1 ha and 3 ha per capita. For the leasehold peasant farms on Hujamazgil farm, who
mainly keep livestock and have non-irrigated and pasture land, per capita landholdings are
around 14 ha.
For purposes of comparison, Table 11 shows the landholdings of peasant farms by district for
Samarkand oblast as a whole. Both independent and leasehold peasant farms are included. The
mean size of such farms varies widely from district to district, according to variations in land
use, population density, and the way the policy and legislative framework is interpreted by
local khokims and their officials. The total share of farm land allocated to peasant farms varies
between 1% and 9% (Bulungur lies at the latter extreme). The mean size of independent
peasant farms ranges from 3 ha in Pakhtachi District to 11 ha in Narpai (with the exception of
one farm of 138 ha in Urgut District). The mean size of leasehold peasant farms ranges from 3
ha in Tailak District to 21 ha in Pairarik (with the exception of five livestock farms in
Pastdargom District with non-irrigated and pasture land). For the oblast as a whole, the mean
size of independent peasant farms is 7 ha, and that of leasehold peasant farms 11 ha.
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Farm enterprise restructuring in Bulungur District, 1990-96
Prior to 1990, all farm enterprises in Bulungur District were state farms. The first significant
reforms began in 1990 following the passage of the Law on Peasant Farms, but the basic
structure of the major farm enterprises remained unchanged until 1992. Although peasant farms
began to be established in the district from 1990-91, these were not recognised as peasant
farms in oblast statistics until 1993. The number of independent peasant farms increased
gradually over 1993-96 from three to six, while the number of leasehold peasant farms rose
from 130 in 1993 to 471 by the start of the 1996. In 1993/94, six state farms were 're-
organised' as 8 collective farms, and in 1995, the remaining 10 state farms were renamed as
cooperatives or 'leased collectives'. By the start of 1996 then, there were no state farms in
Bulungur, but there were 11 collective farms, 12 cooperatives/'leased collectives', six
independent peasant farms, and 471 leasehold peasant farms (see tables 5 and 6).
Collective farm enterprises
Three types of collective farm are said to exist in Bulungur District: collectives, so-called
'lease' collectives, and cooperatives. In spite of these differences in name, it has not been
possible to find anyone within Agrofirm (the 'agroindustrial complex', or local equivalent of
the government department of agriculture), the khokimiat (governor's office), or the farm
enterprises themselves who is able to explain the differences in legal status between these
types of collective farm, even in principle. It is not clear, for example, whether the actual
distribution of shares among members of these enterprises is known.
Two types of land tenure arrangement may co-exist on the territory of any collective farm,
regardless of its stated type (e.g. collective or 'leased' collective). These are leasehold peasant
farms, on the one hand; and sharecropping arrangements with the farm management on annually
negotiated terms, on the other. Leaseholders, at least in principle, have a greater degree of
freedom in where to market their produce and where to obtain inputs and services. In practice,
for both types of farm worker, the farm management generally arranges the marketing of
produce in return for inputs and other services.
Independent peasant farms
The first independent peasant farm in Bulungur District was formed in 1990, and there has been
a gradual increase in their number since then. The maximum number was reached in September
1995 when there were a total of 12 in Bulungur District. However, of the three independent
peasant farms visited in September 1995, it appears that on the whole these enterprises tended
to replicate the internal management structure of collective farms, albeit on a slightly smaller
scale. For example, they retained an administrative staff, including accountants, agronomists
and the like. Individual farm members, who may or may not have rights over a specific parcel
of land, tended to relate to the farm management through some form of sharecropping
arrangement. This does not mean that there is no relationship between work effort and reward
received however; members of the longest established independent peasant farm explained that
this was perhaps the main reason why they prefer present arrangements over those prevailing
under the former state farm. The small size and relatively long period of operation of this farm
(5 years) perhaps made this experience an exception rather than the rule.
Since the beginning of 1996, all the independent peasant farms in Bulungur district have been
're-organised' as cooperatives or re-integrated into collective farms. Since peasant farms are
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intended to be family farms, the large size of these farms was regarded as a violation of the
Law on Peasant Farms. The six independent peasant farms in Bulungur District in January 1996
had average landholdings of 328 ha at the start of 1996, compared with the mean landholding
of 12 ha for leasehold peasant farms. The average size of independent peasant farms in
Samarkand oblast as a whole in January 1996 was a mere 7 ha.
Leasehold peasant farms
At the beginning of 1996, there were 471 leasehold peasant farms in Bulungur district, existing
on the territory of various collective farm enterprises. These have increased in number from
130 at the start of 1993, 155 in 1994, and 224 in 1995. The mean landholdings of leasehold
peasant farms in Bulungur District have remained consistently in the order of 12-14 ha over the
last three years (see table 9). This matches closely the oblast average of 12 ha (1996).
A typical leasehold farm, "Uedus", has 8 ha of irrigated land, farmed by 8 workers from 3-4
related families. Its capital assets include a tractor (purchased for 100,000 sum), a cart, a
plough/ rotivator, and a glasshouse in which lemons and tomatoes are grown. Land has
formally been leased from a collective/ leased farm for three years, but lease payments began
to be collected only in the third year of operation owing to the two-year grace period for newly
established peasant farms. Leaseholders are free to market their produce wherever they like,
but in practice, under the economic conditions currently prevailing, they have little choice but
to opt for a sharecropping arrangement with the collective farm, in the expectation that they
will benefit from the access to markets, transport, and other inputs and services that the
collective farm may provide.
Dispossession of peasant farmers after 1995 harvest
By the beginning of March 1996, not only had all the independent peasant farms in Bulungur
been abolished because they were not true family farms, but around 50 leaseholders (10% of
the total number) had also been dispossessed. It is instructive to examine the reasons for this
decline in number of peasant farms and the process by which it was brought about, as they tell
a great deal about the lack of security of tenure experienced by peasant farmers in Bulungur
District, and the structural disadvantage at which they are placed by comparison with other
types of farm enterprise. For those recently closed peasant farms visited by author, the reasons
stated by those responsible for taking the decision to close the farms are somewhat at odds
with the perception of the farmers themselves.
On taking over office the new khokim of Samarkand oblast ordered an inquiry into the affairs
of peasant farms, having received reports from banks stating that peasant farms were not using
their bank accounts5. Specialists and officials interviewed reported that this concern is related
to the issue of taxation of agricultural production. They worried that peasant farmers are
'working only for themselves, not for the state'. They tend to emphasise those aspects of the
legislative framework that insist on peasant farms carrying out transactions with collective
farms and processing factories by bank transfer, and wanted 'to ensure that actual practice is in
                                                            
5 It is a measure of the lack of trust at all levels of Soviet-influenced Uzbek society that merely to have one's
own bank account should be regarded as a major concession to individual freedom. The heads of new peasant
farms are among the first individuals in rural areas actually to hold bank accounts since the demise of the
USSR. Even then, as an attempt to control inflation by limiting the circulation of money, current laws prohibit
the withdrawal of cash from one's own bank account. Payments may only be made by bank transfer to approved
organisations.
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line with legislation'. However, it appears that a number of collective farm managers have
seized this opportunity to close peasant farms, by exploiting Article 13 of land law which
states that if land not being used properly, it should pass to those who will use it properly (i.e.,
the collectives themselves).
District khokims have responded to the oblast khokim's directive in different ways. In
Pastdargom District, for example, no peasant farms have been closed. In Bulungur District, a
Commission was established to investigate the affairs of all leasehold peasant farms6.  The
Commission visited all collective/leased farms, and inspected records of all peasant farms as
submitted by farms themselves. Meetings were held with the director and economist of each
farm, at which peasant farmers called. It was decided to investigate only the least 'profitable'
farms i.e., those with lowest yields according to the accounts submitted, as recommended by
the Board of Management of the farm to the khokim. It is also reported that directors of farms
are asked to make an assessment of the farms based on their personal assessment of the heads
of those farms, which raises deep concerns about possible abuses of power by farm managers.
There are some safeguards against this however, as the district khokim orders all cases to be
investigated by the Association of Peasant Farms and the state tax inspection. For example,
five peasant farms were recommended for closure on one collective farm, but on further
investigation by the Association of Peasant Farms, all were found to be perfectly in order and
were kept open.
The reasons given for closure of peasant farms were all based on the grounds for termination
of activities of peasant farms contained in Article 23 of the Law on Peasant Farms:
1. Insolvency and failure to use bank accounts for financial transactions
2. Failure to fulfil production quotas
3. Voluntary cessation of activities
However, according to the members of the Bulungur Commission interviewed, these general
grounds were not translated into specific criteria that could transparently be applied in all
cases. Such criteria would include for example, a guideline on what threshold of non-fulfilment
of planned production would be regarded as grounds for termination (e.g. 5% below plan
production, or 50%?). There seems to have been no consistency between and even within
farms as to how this general criterion was applied. Moreover, none of the peasant farmers
interviewed who had been closed down owing to 'voluntary cessation of activities' had
actually requested that they give up their land leases, and some were not even aware that they
had been closed down. The grounds of insolvency is also a moot point in certain cases, since it
was reported by some farmers that they had offered to pay cash to obtain inputs from state
enterprises and collective farms, but had been refused.
                                                            
6 The Commission was made up of: the First Deputy Khokim, the Deputy Chief of Agrofirm, the district Land
Use Officer, the Head of the Association of Peasant Farms, the local representatives of the State Tax
Inspection, State Insurance Board, and Tadbirkor Bank, and the District Notary.
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Constraints faced by peasant farms in Bulungur
Apart from those cases in which collective farm managers appear to have abused their powers
to bring about a transfer of land from peasant farms back to the collective farms, there are many
structural constraints experienced by Bulungur's peasant farmers which place them in a highly
vulnerable position, and at serious risk of losing their land leases.
According to the Law on Peasant Farms, peasant farms have a free choice of what crops they
may grow. But in practice they are required by the terms of their contracts with collective
farms to grow particular crops under sharecropping arrangements. The range of crops for
which they are required to deliver a large proportion of production to the collective farm
greatly exceeds the legal requirement, which is only to deliver 50% of planned wheat and
cotton production for the state order. However, individual peasant farmers have little or no
bargaining power to negotiate better contracts with collective farms, or to insist on being able
to use cash for transactions rather than a share of their product. They have little choice but to
comply with the contract terms set by the collective farms and processing factories, because of
the monopsonistic position of those enterprises as the main source of inputs, and their
monopolistic position as the only viable market for many products.
Collective farms and processing factories are themselves chronically short of cash, and many
are reported to be on the verge of technical bankruptcy (but not actual bankruptcy since the
state continues to allow them to roll forward their debts). The main losers in this situation are
the peasant farmers, who face lengthy delays in payment for their produce. Many farmers
interviewed had not received payment for several years, receiving only payment in the form of
consumer goods or such production inputs as the collective farms decide to give them. Owing
to a lack of cash, many if not most peasant farmers are unable to purchase essential inputs
except by making payments in kind from their farm production, or by pledging a share of the
next year's harvest. They may alternatively sell produce privately in the bazaar in order to
obtain cash. In either case, they are left with too little of their total production to be able to
satisfy their contracted production quota with collective farms or processing enterprises. This
places the peasant farms at risk of being dispossessed on the grounds of non-fulfilment of
production targets.
Other commonly mentioned structural constraints prevent peasant farms from realising their
planned production in the first place. For example, many peasant farmers interviewed felt they
had been allocated the worst land by their collective farms (e.g. poorly drained or poorly
irrigated). Peasant farms are given lowest priority in gaining access to machinery from
collective farms, and often receive assistance only from machinery in poor repair. Lengthy
delays in getting access to machinery leads to late sowing or harvesting and consequently
lower yields. Peasant farmers have no good sources of information or advice about possible
technical options or market opportunities that may be open to them. In sum, peasant farms not
only lack positive support, but they operate within an environment which is hostile to them.
From discussions held with specialists in Samarkand, it is reported that a major reason for the
recent slow-down in the rate of establishment of peasant farms is that they are increasingly
seen as jeopardising the ability of collective farms to meet state orders for wheat and cotton.
Peasant farms were originally intended as livestock producing farms, and Presidential decrees
aimed at deepening reforms in livestock production were largely aimed at peasant farms (it is
reported that 85% of livestock in Bulungur are now held by peasant farms). But the recent
drive to increase grain production in Uzbekistan has meant that peasant farms are now being
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pushed by the collective farms on which they substantially depend into grain production. The
consequent reduction of feed crop production has led to a rapid decline in livestock numbers.
The suggested reason why so many peasant farms are now being closed is that collective farms
are looking for ways to increase their own wheat/cotton production in order to meet their own
increasing obligations to the state. Bulungur District is actually in a relatively favourable
situation, since it has no cotton, and so has a freer choice of crop mix than in many other
districts.
Comparative performance of collective and peasant farms
In spite of the many structural problems faced by peasant farms described above, it is most
significant that peasant farms still manage on average to obtain higher crop yields than
collective farms. Disaggregated data were obtained from Agrofirm (for collective farms) and
the Association of Peasant Farms (for peasant farms), of mean yields per hectare for three
major crops in Bulungur District, selected to represent a range of production conditions (e.g.,
more/less mechanised). Disaggregated data are available only for 1994 and 1995, the two
years the Association of Peasant Farms has been in existence.
Overall, the data show that peasant farms obtained mean crop yields some 15%-25% higher
than those of collective farms. For wheat, peasant farm yields were 15% higher in 1994 and
19% higher in 1995. For potatoes, peasant farm yields were 7% higher in both years. For
grapes, peasant farm yields were 52% higher in 1994 and 19% higher in 1995. The 1994 grape
harvest in Bulungur was very poor overall, owing to a severe late frost. The harvest was only
12% of planned production for the district as a whole. But peasant farms managed to withstand
this shock much better than collective farms, and managed to achieve 26% of plan fulfilment,
more than twice the district average. These data strongly support the hypothesis that farms
based on the use of family labour have much stronger incentives to maximise the efficiency of
labour than do collective farms. This more than any other single fact provides a strong case in
favour of continuing and intensifying the land and agrarian reform programme.
This account of the ongoing land and agrarian reforms in a single district of Uzbekistan
illustrates the very real lack of the 'social capital' that seems necessary to make the reform
process work. The P/C mode of operation is so strongly prevalent throughout society, and is
reinforced by historically evolved norms, that efforts to expand individual freedoms and
devolve control over economic decisions to individual farming families are currently being
stymied. A resource-based theory of power does not fully explain the reluctance of many
collective farm managers to loosen their grip over agricultural production. The once-
controlling party hierarchy is at least outwardly banned. Collective farms themselves are so
chronically short of cash that they would benefit more from allowing peasant farmers to
purchase inputs from them in cash rather than in kind. Yet the ingrained norms that lock farm
enterprises, input suppliers and output markets together by means of in-kind transactions
prevent this from taking place, at considerable cost to both peasant farmers and even the
collectives themselves. As the legislative and policy framework edges towards making ever
more concessions to private enterprise, the collective farm system appears to be retrenching.
Although the legislative and policy framework for land and agrarian reform in Uzbekistan is
moving in the direction of greater liberalism, the way the reforms are implemented in practice
shows how far P/C modes of group operation need to be relaxed in order for T/R relations to
be relied upon to deliver the stated objectives of the reform programme.
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IV DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The empirical cases above suggest that land and agrarian reforms in post-Soviet Central Asia
will fail to meet the objectives of increasing agricultural productivity, expanding private
initiative, and allowing for the sustainable management of natural resources unless institutions
at all levels of society relax the grip of power and control, and instead foster trust and
reciprocity. We began with two dilemmas. First, the language of collective action is
unfortunately associated in the former Soviet Union with the failed experience of agricultural
collectivisation, thus hindering productive debate. Second, while norms of trust and reciprocity
are urgently needed to make agrarian reforms work, they appear to be sadly lacking in wider
society itself. It is almost a contradiction in terms to suggest that public policy might be able to
help build social capital in society, since in the post-Soviet context it is the structure of public
administration that has done so much historically to erode social capital. Yet this appears to be
one promising direction for future research, in order to identify possible sources of social
capital on which to build.
For example, in parallel with the rural Soviets (councils of people's deputies) in Uzbekistan
was another, more informal system of social leadership and power. The makhalla is literally a
block of private houses, and traditionally had its own committee for self-administration,
usually centred around the local tea-house (chaikhana). It performs various social and ritual
functions during ceremonies such as marriages, funerals, and the celebration of religious
holidays. It usually has its own collective property for preparing feasts, which may also be
borrowed by members for their own use. The makhalla also plays a role in resolving local
disputes and, more recently, is being used as the chief means to channel social welfare
payments to low-income families under the national poverty alleviation programme. This
institution is not equally strong throughout the republic, however. Although it plays an
important role in the Tashkent region and in the densely populated Fergana valley, it is much
less prevalent in the regions of Samarkand and Bukhara (Zholdasov 1996).
The makhalla may be contrasted with the newly created Associations of Peasant Farms (APF).
In their conception, the APFs are intended to be institutions of civil society, providing services
and pressing claims on behalf of their members. Such services offered to peasant farms include
assistance in preparing quarterly financial reports for banks and tax returns to the inland
revenue; assistance in gaining access to fuel, fertiliser and other inputs, according to the
hectarage of each farm; acting as broker in arranging barter trade between leasehold farms, or
between leasehold peasant farms and other enterprises and organisations; and acting as broker
in arranging for the hire of machinery or equipment owned by other peasant farmers or
collective farms7. However, the APFs were formed by government decree and are often
physically located within the khokimiat (local administration). Peasant farms contract with the
Association to receive these services over an initial 10 year period, in return for a 3% share of
gross sales revenue, submitted annually to the Association by bank transfer. In practice, the
APFs do not have the capacity or the resources to deliver these services to more than a very
small proportion of peasant farms. No peasant farmer interviewed in Bulungur district had
received any support services from the Association. At present, owing to these resource
constraints, the activities of the Association are geared more towards reporting upwards to
oblast and republican levels than to supporting its member farms.
                                                            
7 Some of the machinery and equipment of collective farms was privatised and distributed to peasant farms;
peasant farms have also purchased other capital assets directly on the open market.
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The presence of social capital - norms of trust and reciprocity, but not necessarily equality - is
relatively strong in the makhalla, but virtually absent from the Association of Peasant Farmers.
An important precedent was established by using the makhalla as a vehicle for social welfare
policy, but there is no reason why the same could not be true for institutions involved more
directly in land and agrarian reforms. Experience from the common property resource
management literature suggests that building social capital is a function of history and
contingency, the relatively small size and stability of groups, and prevailing social norms.
Perhaps the most promising avenue for further research with those responsible for policy
making in Central Asia's land and agrarian reform process is to open up a debate around such
issues as what are the institutional underpinnings of 'true' commons, and how these should be
distinguished from the Soviet experience of agricultural collectives. Unless this debate can be
opened up, there is a danger that the unbridled market model may help perpetuate "a social and
institutional history which is unfavourable to good group behaviour" (Stewart 1996: 23).
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